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The Role of Central Banks during Economic
Downturn: Lessons and Options for Financing
Government Programmes in Nigeria
Charles N. 0. Mord/·

I.

Introduction

C

entral banks by their very nature are unique institutions and therefore,
play a very important role in all economies-whether in advanced,
emerging markets and developing economies. This role is often
derived from their mandate(s), as enshrined in the laws establishing them and
have tended to evolve as the economy processes. In discerning the role
played by central banks, it is observed that there is role that is generally
common, irrespective of whether the economy is advanced, emerging or
developing while some roles tend to be economy specific. For example, while
the stabilisation role appears to be common across economies; in modern
times, the developmental role tends to be more closely associated with
emerging markets and developing countries-largely because these
economies are more or less still evolving.
Economic history has taught us that even some central banks in the
advanced economies played an important role in the financing of
government programmes/projects in their early days, for example, the
Deutsche Bundesbank of Germany in rebuilding the country after the world
war 2. Other countries include: the UK (1694), the US in the 19th century, France
(1800) , Belgium (1850), and Spain (1874) (see Epstein, 2006). Two central banks
that are known to have been actively involved in financing government
programmes/projects in recent times are Banco Central Do Brazil (Central
Bank of Brazil) and Bank Negara Malaysia (Central Bank of Malaysia).
The financing of government programmes/projects by central banks seemed
to have lost some of its popularity even among emerging markets and
developing economies during the period leading to the 2007-2009 global
financial crisis and its attendant economic downturn. The crisis and the
associated economic downturn has apparently opened up another wave of
debate among economists on the role of central banks during economic
crisis.

• Charles N. O. Mordi is o Retired Director of the Research Deportment. Central Bonk of Nigeria.
The usual disclaimer applies.
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In the period leading to the 2007/2009 global financial and economic (GFE)
crises, a consensus seemed to have emerged that the stabilisation role of
central banks- maintaining price stability, should be the centerpiece of
central banks' monetary policy. Indeed, in some economies, it is the sole
objective of monetary policy. This seeming consensus emanated from the
apparent "success" of central banks that adopted inflation-targeting (IT) as a
monetary policy framework from the early 1990s, in stabilising their
economies-that is, taming inflation.
The "dismal" performance of most of the IT countries during the crisis has
raised concerns as to the universal applicability of this paradigm-pursuing
price stability as the sole objective of monetary policy during economic crisis.
Undeniably, the GFE crises have brought to the fore the need for central
banks to always pay serious attention to what is happening in the macroeconomy and how it impacts on the banking system as well as the financial
system as a whole.
The theme of this executive seminar, and indeed, the topic for this session,
raises some fundamental issues/questions with regard to the role of Central
Bank of Nigeria during economic downturn.
The issues are of particular relevance to the Nigerian economy of today and
include the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

What is(are) the traditional role(s) of central banks?
Should this(these) role(s) change in economic downturn?
Should central banks really be involved in financing government
programmes at all, particularly during economic downturn?
If the answer to the preceding question is yes, what are the likely
implications and does the initial conditions matter in that regard?
What lessons can we draw from central banks' experiences during
the recent global financial and economic crises?
Since financing government programmes by the CBN is not new,
how successful has the Bank been in this area?
Can these lessons help shape the future direction of CBN's role in
the economy, particularly against the backdrop of the current
economic recession in the country?

II.
Traditional Roles of Central Banks In the Economy
The role that a central bank perform in an economy derives principally from
the mandate(s), as set out in the laws establishing that central bank.
Traditionally, in most countries the central bank serves as the principal
authority for the nation's financial matters, in addition to being a key partner
in economic policy issues.
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Overall, the roles that virtually all central banks routinely perform include:
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

Implementing monetary policy geared toward delivering
robust and consistent growth and employment;
Determining interest rates that facilitate the effective
mobilisation and efficient utilisation of scarce financial
resources to support productive investment, growth and
development;
Controlling a country's money supply to ensure a noninflationary growth trajectory;
Promoting the stability of the country's financial system through
the effective regulation and supervision of the banking industry;
Managing the country's foreign reserves and gold reserves;
"Lender of Last Resort'' role-to maintain liquidity in the
economy to prevent the financial system from collapsing; and
Promoting the development of the payment system
infrastructure and safeguarding its smooth functioning.

Perhaps, it is important to stress that these roles evolved gradually over the
years. In the specific case of the Central Bank of Nigeria, in addition to the
roles listed above, the Bank has also been assigned a developmental role, as
stated in Section 31, of the CBN Act 2007. This role aims at promoting and
developing not only the capital markets, but also supporting
financial/economic growth and development.
Of all these roles, perhaps the ones that bear a direct link to the theme of this
seminar and the subject of the session are those related to the conduct of
monetary policy-interest rate and lender-of-last resort, and developmental
functions.
Ill.

Seleded Country Experiences of Central Banks' Role during the 20072009 Global Financial and Economic Crisis

The 2007-2009 global financial crisis and the ensuing economic slump
witnessed an unprecedented direct intervention by central banks in
economic activities and financing of government programmes aimed at
mitigating the adverse impact of the crises.
Indeed, central banks all over the wor1d unleashed their "lender-of-last resort"
role by adopting non-traditional measures through massive injection of
liquidity to stem the collapse of their financial systems and to stimulate the real
economy in the wake of the economic recession that accompanied the
financial turmoil. These non-traditional measures have been termed
"Quantitative Easing" (QE for short) in the economics lexicon and involved the
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large-scale purchase of assets that central banks would normally not touch
and the unlimited supply of reserves to shore-up base money.
111.1

Advanced Economies

According to Fawley and Neely (2013), the QEs programmes of the Federal
Reserve (Fed), Bank of England (BoE), European Central Bank (ECB) and Bank
of Japan (BoJ) were initially targeted at alleviating financial market distress,
but this was later broadened to include achieving inflation targets, stimulating
the real economy, and containing the European sovereign debt crisis. They
noted further that the ECB and BoJ focused their programmes on direct
lending to banks - reflecting the bank-centric structure of their financial
systems -while the Fed and BoE expanded their respective monetary bases by
purchasing bonds.
In reality, although the four central banks announced outright asset purchases
their approaches differed:

•
•

The Fed and BoE targeted large amounts of assets to purchase;
The ECB and BoJ chose to ease their monetary policy stance
primarily by supplying amount of loans to banks, as they
required;
• The ECB and BoJ outright asset purchases were generally small
and targeted specific assets.
A summary of the QE programmes of the Fed, ECB, BoE, and BoJ are
contained in the tables below culled from Fawley and Neely (2013).
The abbreviations used in the tables include:
• Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
• Mortgage-backed security (MBS)
• The Covered Bonds Purchase Programme (CBPP)
• Securities Market Programme (SMP) ,
• Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)
• Long-term refinancing Operation {LTRO)
• Rxed rate full allotment (FRFA)
• Growth-Supporting Funding Facility (GSFF)
• Rxed-rate Operations (FROs)
• Exchange-traded funds (ETFs)
• Japanese real estate investment trusts (J-REITs)
• Japanese government bonds (JGBs)
• Corporate finance instruments (CFI)

~

able 1A

~

Important Announcements by th• Federal Reserve
o.te

Program

E-nt

Brief ~Krlptlon

11/25/2008

QE1

rOMC siatement

12/1/2008
12/16/2008

QC 1
QE 1

8ffNnke speech
fOMC stal<,mfflt

LSAPs announced Fed wlll pu,ch;ise $100 billion In GSE debt and $500 billion
lnMBS
First suggesllon o f otendmg OE to TreasurlM.
First SuggMIIOn o r f'Xlending OE to TrNSO<IH by fOMC.

1/28/2009
3/18/2009

QCI
OE1

FOMCstatement
FOMC statement

8117n009
9/23/2009
11/<412009
8/10/2010

OE1
QE1
0(1
Q[l

FOMC statemrnt
FOMC St&tement
FOMC statement
rOMC SIHement

8/27/2010
9/21/2010

OU
QC2

llet'nanke speech

10/12/2010

QE2

FOMC mlnllles released

10/1512010
11/3/2010
6122/2011

QE2
QE2
Qf2

Bemankc speech
FOMC staternent
FOMC Statement

9/21/2011

Matul'lty Exten,,on
Program

FOMC ltat~ment

Maturity Extension

FOMC s tatement

Interest rate new,

6/20/201l

Program

8/22/2012

OU

FOMC minutes released

9/13/2017

00

rOMC St.a t.mf'nt

12/12/2012

OF3

FOMC statf'mrt\l

(>

G'

The Ft'd cuts the ft'd=I funds
rate from 1 '1ft 10 0.00-0.25%;
expects low rares "for lOme

time•

FOMC 51a1ement

;l

Fed su,nds rea<iy to e,cpand QE and buy Treasuries
LSAPs expanded Fed wlU porch;ise $300 bHllon kl long-tc,rm Treasuries an<i
Fed '-'•Peets low rates for
an add,tlonal $7S0 and $100 billion ,n MBS and GSE debt. rt,spectJvcly
·•n e•tcnd«t p,,rlod:
I SAPs slowc,d; All purchases w,11 finish by ,~ end of October. not mld-S..ptember.
LSAPs slowed: Agency debt and MBS purchases w,11 finish at the end ol 2010 Q1 .
LSAPs downsl2ed Agency debt purchases wlll finish at S 17S bRllon
Balanue •heet maintained The F1'd w,11 relnY<"St principal paymf'nts from LSAPs
In Treasuries.
Be-nanke •~•ts role for llddlllorwil OE •should furth<er action p,ow neci,ssary~
FOMC emphail,es low lnRatlOt"\ which "Is likely t o remain subd~ for some
tlmc, before rblng t o l<-vels the Comm ln..e consod<!n conslstf'nt with 115 manda,...•
FOMC meml>ers..sense· Is thal •[additlonall accommodMlon may be appropriate
before long;
Bc<nankl! reiterates thot red stands re.>dy to furthc,r HSe policy.
OE2 announct'd· Fed w,11 purchase $600 b,lllon In Treasurlf'S.
OE2 finishes; Treasury pun:hases wlft wrap up •• the end of month. as scheduled.
prlnclj)AI payments wlN contrnue to be reinvest~
~tunty Extension Progrilm (•Opt!ra tlon Twist') announced Th<, H'd w,11 purchase
$400 bllllon of T1Nsu1 !ti with remaining maturities of 6 to 30 yearJ and sell an
equal amouot with rem.lolf,g 1,wtur11re> of 3 y,,ars or leu. MBS and ag<mcy d.t>t
p,lnclpaj pay.,_,ts w• no longer be relm••iled In ln!asur5", but inJ1ead In MBS
Maturity Extension Program ewtffidl!d· ll,e Ft'd wlll continue to pure hue long term
securities and sell short-lerm s«urltleJ tlvough the end of 2012 Purchas.!.tialN
w,11 continue at the current pace. about $45 blllonlmonth
FOMC members •Judged that addlllonal mon,.tary accommodatton would likely
be warranled fairly soon...•
QEJ announced Th<! F.cl WIii purchMe $40 bHlton of MRS pc, month as long
F«I expects low rat.-s "at
as "the outlook for the labor martr.et does not lmp«>W substantt.\lly. In the
lo,ast through mld-201S"
con10,w1 of pr1ce stability•
OE3 o,xpand..d: The Fed will continue to purchase $45 billion t>f lnng-te,m
The Fed e-ts low rau.s to
TrNsurles per month but w,11 no longer sterdlu pu,chases lhrough the s.le
be appropriate while unemof short•tenn Treasurif!s
ployment Is nbove 6 5 pe«:enl
and lnffatior, IJ forecasted
below 2.5 per«nl
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Table 18

~

Important Announcements by the European Central Bank
~ti

Program

Event

Brief desaiption

3/28/2008

LTRO

LTRO expanded: 6-month LTROs are announced.

10/15/2008

FRFA

Governing CouncW
press release
Governing CouncU
press releose

S/7/2009

CBPP/lTRO

SMP

Governing Council
press release

6/30/2010

CBPP

10/6/2011

CBPP2

GoVfflllng Council
press release
Governing Council
press release
Govemlng Council
press 1elease

[

c:,

i
...,
0

Rennanclng operations expanded· All refinancing operations wlll be
conducted with fixed-rate tenders and full illlotmcnt; the 11st of assets eligible
as collateral In credit operations with the Bank ls expanded to Included lowerrated (with the exception of asset-backed sec1K1tiesl and nort-eUro-«nomlnated
assets.
CBPP announced/lTRO expanded·The ECB will purchase £60 biNJon in
euro-denominated covered bonds; 12-month LTROs are announced.

C.oW"mlng Coun<U
press releue

5/10/2010

Interest rate news

•

SMP ilOnounced The ECB w~i conduct Interventions in the euro area public
and private debt securities markets, purchases wm be sterilized.
CBPP finished· Purchases finish on schedule; bonds purchased will be held
through maturity.
C8PP2 announced: The ECB will purchase €40 bilt1011 In euro-denomlnated
covered bonds.
LTRO expanded:36-month LTROs are announced. eligible collateral ls
expanded.

12/8/2011

LTRO

812/201]

OMT

ECB press conference

ECB President M~roo Dnghi Indates that the ECB ~I expand SOve<CICJn
debt purchases. He proclalms that •the euro Is Irreversible:

9/6/2012

OMT

GoVfflling Council
press release

OMTs announced Countries that appty to the European Subilizatlon
Mechanism (ESM) for aid .ind .ibide by the BM's terms o1nd cond1hons will
be eligible to have th@lr debt purchased In unlimited amounts on the secondary
market by the ECB.

z

i:!.'
"'

ECB lowers the main
refinancing rate by 0.25%
to 1% and the rate on the
marginal lending faclllty by
0.50% to I 75%
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l
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ECB lowers the main
reflNlnclng rate by 0,25'11,
to 1%, and the rate on the
marginal lending faclllty by
0.25% to 1 75%
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Table 1C

;;l
~

Important Announcements by the Bank of England

6'

Otte

"'°9r1m

Event

Brief description

1/19/2009

APF

HM Treasury stattment

APF established The BOE w,I purchase up to £50 billon of"htgh quality
private sector ilSSets• flllilnced by Treasury Issuance.

2111n009

1rsn009

snn009
8/6/2009

APF
APF

APf
APf

80£ lnftatlon Report
released

The BO£ views a slight downside risk to meebng th!! inflation target

MPC stattmeOt

Q£ ,nnounced:The BOE wUI purtha~ up to £7S bill1011 In assets, now
f,na~ by reserYe issuance; mediun1• and long-h!rm gilts will compme
the "majority" of new pu.rchases.

MPC statement

OE expanded: The BOE w,11 puichase up to £.125 boH1011 In ilssets.

MPC statement

OE expanded:The BOE will purchase up to £.175 blR10n In assets; to
accommodate the lncttased ~ , the BOE will ~ p,stNSC!S mto gilts
with remaining matunry of 3 years or more

MPC statement

Q£ expanded.The 80£ w,11 purchase up to £200 bllion on assets.

2/ /2010

APF

MPC statement

OE malntiined: The BOE maintains the stock of asset purchases flnaoced by
the issuance of reser.~ it £200 blll-0n; MY/ purcNStS of pnvne mets .,.."1
be financed by TrNsury 1Ssuance.

10/6/2011

APf

MPC statement

OE expanded The BOE wdl purchase up to ms blRion in assets fnanced
by reseM lssuanct; the et1ling on privite iSSets held remains £.50 billion.

11/29/2011

APF

HM Treasury deck,on

Maximum private asset PIJ(Chases reooced: HM TreilSUry lowers the ceiling

on APF private asset holdings from £50bllon to £.10 bllion.
OE expanded: The BOE wHI purchase up to ms blNlon in assets
OE expanded: The BOE will purchase up to 075 biNion in assets

•

2/9'2012

APF

MPC statement

7/5/2012

APF

MPC suren~nt

"Q,..,,
0

:::,

[
CP

reiterates APf as a potential policy instrument

APF

111Sn009

Interest rate news

The BOE cuts policy rate f,om
1% to 05~ the ECB cuts
policy rate from~ to 1.5%.

~

Q.
~

;:l.

:::,
00
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0

9

c;·

0
0

~

~

NOTE: MP(. Monerary Policy Commlnee.

.....
.....

-..)

00

Table 10
Important Announcements by tht hnk of Ja!Mn
Date

12/2/2008

Program
SfSOs

Evtnt
Unschtduled mooelil)'
pollcyfflffting

The BOJ will Oil«•~ I fKlhty through lhe end of Ap(U 10 lend an unlimited
amount 10 !Molts 11 the unc~hnllzltd O'fflnigh1 c.alt ,a~ and collaterJl!led
b)I co,pome d<!t>L

Oulrighl pun:hlSCS expanded The BOJ lncrases monthly JGB purchases
0.St lnc..-ed Oc10be< 2002) from VI .2 trilion 10 ¥1 4 IT~llon they wil .tso
look k1to purchlslng commen:lal pipe,.
Outright pu1Chases ¥100U11Ced: The 80J will purchase up 10 VJ trillion In
comme<cill paper and AIICP and Is -,g.>1,ng outfight purchases of
c:oiporate bond$.
Outright pun:l\ases exJ)Andcd The BOJ wiN extend commcrci.l paper
pun:haies and the SFSOs through the end of ~embe, !pfeviously end of
MMch) and w,N purchase up to Y1 trillon In corpo111e bonds

12119noos

Oucr,ght JGB/Cfl
purchHos

Slalemtttton
moneIii)' policy

1/22/2009

Outright Cfl
purchases

Statement on
monelllfY policy

2/19/2009

Outrlghl CFI
purchaies

Sra,ememon
monetary policy

3/18/7009

Ouulght.JG8
purchases

Sl~len1'01on
monetary policy

7/IS/2009

OutnghtCFI
pu,d\Oses/SfSOs
Outright CFI

S1ateme<>lon
monelory policy
Stottmfflt on

pu,chases/SfSOs

monetAry policy

10/30/2009

Brief description

12/1/2009

FROs

Statemtnt on
monetary pol'rcy

JJl7n010

•HOs

S121no10

GSIT

Statement on
mDnelllfY policy
Stalem«1t on
monetary policy

8/30/2010

FROs

10/5/2010

CMf

Unscheduled mooetM)'
pol,cy mfftlng
Statement on
mone1ary pol,cy

Interest rate news

Q
0

[
0:,

The BOJ lowc<l lhc targel ro,
lht uncoll,He<al,zrd ~night
c,N 111e from OJoi. to 0.1'6.

i

0
...,

z
~:i.

""
g,
0
6

Outfight pun:haSt!s expanded The BOJ lncre,lscs mon1hly JGB purchases from
V1 4 1rllllon to VIJI trillion.
Progr,1ms ~ The llOJ enmds the SFSOs and out119h1 purcham or
corpo,1te p,per and bonds through the end ol the 'fNI'.
Status of p,og,1ms: Outright purchlses of corpo,11' Ol\lf>ee Instruments w,11
expke st !ht end ol 2009 IS l'X~ted. bot the SFS05 will be extended through
201(>()1; llnl)le liquidity l)IOYlslon l)ISl 2010:Ql Will occur t!Yough fundssoP!llying operatrons ~Inst pooled cofla~ which WIii Kc:ept a lo'l)Cr range
ofcoll.n~
FK,lity announcement The BOJ will o~ ~10 triftlon In 3 ~ loins 191lns1
1M fuH ffll!OU of ttig,ble collllt~ II t h e ~ ~ -night oil rate
fKillty c•~nslon: The BOJ expands 1M size of the FROs 10 ¥20 nrlhon.

:i
;:;·
i::,

6-

s1

i::,

~

l

~
,::

~-t

GSFF announcement The 80J will~ V3 tr,llion In l~;or ~ns 10 prlv~tc
flnAnclal lnshlUIIOOS wllh p,ojecl p,o~ls for ·st~thenlng lhe found,ulons
for economic g,owth."
fKdtlyexpanskn The BOJ adds ¥10 tJdlion in6-fflonth mns to the FROs.
APP establ,sht>d The IIOJ w,11 pu,cha~ VS trlllion 10 assets (Y35 triltlon In JCiBs
ind Treasury disc;ount bllls, ¥ I trilron on commc<cr.11 p;1pe< and co,po,ate
bonds. and ¥0.5 tJrllion In £Th .,,cl J-l!EJTs'

The BOJ sell lhc t.>rgel for the
uncollateillrzed -night oil
rat• at around Oto 0.1~
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Tabl" 1D, cont'd

~

Important Announcements by the Bank of Japan

;l
0

O.te

Program

Event

Brief descripdon

3/14/2011

CME

Statement on
monetary policy

APP expanded: The BOJ will purdwe an ~tional VS tnllion In •ssets
(VOS trllllon In JG8s, ¥1 trlhlon In TreasUI}' discount blls. ¥15 1rllllon in
commercial paJ>N, VIS trllhon In COfl)OQte bonds, V04S tnlhon ,n ms.
and ¥0 OS lnll,on In J·RflTs).

Statement on
monetary pot,cy

GSFF expanded; The 90) INkes avadablc another VOS trlll,on in loans 10
p,lme flnanclal Institutions for the purpose of inYPstlng In equity .lnd
~•ltnding a=t-bilsed loans.
APP/fROs expand.cl The BOJ W1lt pun:tww an add,1IOOII VS tnU,on In os~11
(¥2 trUllon In JGBs. ¥1.S t11lllon In Treasury discount blls. YO.I lflUlon In
commercial paper, VO 9 trrlt,on In CDrpofate bonds. ¥05 trillion In ~ Tfs. and
¥0.01 tnn,on In J-REITs.l. 6-fflonlh coll.tte1.tlttd loins through m. rROs are
expanded by ¥S trillion

6/14/2011

8/412011

GSfF

CMf

SlartlTINlt on
monetary policy

lnt..-est r•~ news

;,::,
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Statement on
monetary pol,cy
Statemen1 on
monetary policy

APP expanded· The BOJ w,ft purchase an addrtlooal VS u'IHlon In JG8s.

8

APP expanded·The BOJ w1I purchase an addrlional VlO tnlllon In JGBs.

2.
n

GSFF

Statement on
monetary pot,cy

4n7/2012

CM[

Statement on
monetary pot,cy

GSfF exl)1IOCled; The 90J mai,,es alllilable anolhcer Y2 trollon on~, to p,lv11e
financl.ll Institutions. lnclud,ng ¥1 ofhon In US~r~lOflliNled loam ind
YOS 1111hon In smaller-sued (VI millK>n-¥10 moltion) loans
APP t'Xp.t~AOs reduced The flOJ will pun:hose? an Mlditlonal Y10 tnhlon
In JG8s. Y0.2 trllion In ms. Mid \IO 01 In J.IIEITs. The 8oJ also reduces the
IV.li~llty or6-month FRO loanl ~ ¥5 trflllon.

/112/201l

CME

APP cxp,nded/FROs reduced: The BOJ wlN purchaH an addttlonal ¥5 trlllton kl
Tre,uu,y dkcounl bllk and rcduc~ the avu.bUity o( FRO loans by YS trlllion

9119/2012

CME

Slall'lnet11 on
monet>ry pot,cy
Statement on
monetary pol,cy

10ll0/2012

Ct.lE/SBLF

SIMtmenlon

APP t'XP,nded/SBlF announced The BO/
puicha~ an add,llonill ¥S trUllon
In JGBs. ¥S tlll lOl1 In Trssury d1SCO<lf'II bills, Y0.1 trillon In cOIMlefdal pap«,
¥0.3 1r11llon In corporalt' bondj, ¥0.S trflhon In F1Fs, and Y0.01 U11,on ,n J-Rf.lTs.
Through the 5Blf it will fund up to 100 percent of depository insthutlons' net
ncruse In lend,ng 10 the nonllnancail sec10r

10/27/2011

CME

2/14/2012

CME

3/13/2012

monet>ry pol,cy

, mono 12

CME

S1a1ement on
monetary policy

C

0

0
0

~

~

APP exp.i~ The BOJ wil porc~se an lldditK>NI YS tnllton ,n >Gas iOnd
¥5 triN,on in Treuury dlscounl bills.

w•
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111.2
Developing Economies
In the case of Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), bin Ibrahim (2010) stated that
pre-emptive and precautionary measures were taken in response to the crises
to preserve the stability of the financial system; and ensure the continuity of
credit flows.
Table 2

Ensuring c ontinued access to SME financ ing

Facility
SME

Amount
<USO )

200m

&tablJ-

shed
Aug
2008

Assistance

Facillty

O bjective

R emarks

To a.s8isl vi.able SMEo facin g financial
difficulties to manage temporary cash now
problems due to risin g costs

Fully utilised

SME
Modernisation
Fadlily

14-2m

Aug
2008

To provide Ona.ncing to SMEs to modernise
their ope.ratiorui, ln particular to purchase or
upgrade machinery and cqu.ipmcnt. u well as
for energy-saving equJpment

Fully uUliscd

Mlcro
E nterprise
Fund

57m

Nov
2008

To enhance access to mtcroflnanclng for
mtcro enterprises with vfablc businesses

Partly u tilised

SM£

600m

Jan
2009

To assist viable SMEa advcr• e ly lmpaelcd by
the economic slowdown t.o continue
obtalntng acccs.s to adequate financing

Replacement. of
t.he S ME
Assutancc and
Modcr~tion
FaciliUes

1.4-bn

Apr
2009

To assist. viable companies with shareholder
equity or below RM 20 mllllon to gain
access to financing in order to malnta1n their
operations am id the challenging economic

Government
gu.arantecs 80'Vo of
working capital

envl.r o nmcnt

banking

Assistance
Guarantee

Scheme

Worlclng
Capital
Guarantee
Scheme

funding from
institutions , whJdl

were ruUy utilised

lndustry
Rcrtructuring
Loan Guaran t ee
Scheme

l .4bn

Apr
2009

To promote investments:
• that ino-ca.sc product.ivlty;
• in hJgh- vaJuc-addcd. ac:UvitJcs (s uch a.s

Government
guar~ntccs 50-

80% or
fonding or long-

rcs.ca.rch and development, and downstream

term in vcsbncnts

agriculture activities);

obtained &om
banking

and to promote the great.er
appUcation of green technology

institutions ,

depending on the
size of
shareholders'
equlty

This included specific and targeted measures to preserve confidence and
address the highly vulnerable segments and potential areas of stress:
• Extending a blanket guarantee on all ringgit and foreign currency
deposits with commercial, Islamic and investment banks and
deposit-taking development financial institutions regulated by the
BNM through the Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation;
• Extending access to the BNM's liquidity facility to insurance
companies and operators regulated and supervised by the BNM;
• Ensuring banks' accessibility to USO liquidity for trade financing
purposes; and
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Intensifying engagement with industry players, businesses and
large corporate as well as trade bodies.
In addition, efforts were mainly targeted towards ensuring that
businesses and households continued to have adequate and
uninterrupted access to financing, which measures encompass
improving and broadening access to financing through:
• Support to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)see Table 2 below;
• Deepening capital market activity;
• Addressing potential borrower distress; and
• Accommodative monetary policy.

The measures taken by the CBN, in response to the crises were broadly
identical in nature to those taken by the selected central banks, but differed
only in the case of the QE in term of the transmission vehicle through which
the QE was implemented. While the other central banks actually provided
liquidity/credit directly to the banks or other financial institutions-apparently
to "repair" their balance sheets, the CBN on its part provided credit to specific
sectors of the economy that were deemed to have the potential to enhance
productivity and economic growth.
The CBN initially utilised a mixture of policies including:
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Stoppage of aggressive liquidity mop-up;
Progressive reduction of monetary policy rate (MPR) ;
Progressive reduction in the cash reserve requirement;
Reduction of liquidity ratio requirement;
introduction of expanded discount window (EDW) to increase
DMB's access to facilities from the CBN; this was later replaced
with the CBN guarantee of interbank money market
transactions;
Guarantee of letters of credit and/or foreign counterparties
creditors to the DMBs;
Limit on deposit money banks' (DMBs) foreign exchange net
open positions;
Rollover of margin loans that were extended to equity investors,
amongst others; and
Injection of W620 billion as tier 2 capital in 8 troubled banks.

The QE segment of the CBN intervention came later, in 2010, when the Bank
by virtue of its developmental function, as contained in Section 31 of the CBN
Act, 2007, decided to establish a W500 billion facility for investment in
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debenture stock of the Bank of Industry for long-term (10 - 15 years) lending to
Deposit Money Banks (DMBs);
The facility was targeted to specific sectors of the economy, namely: The sum
of W300bn was for financing of power projects and the refinancing of airlines'
existing facilities with the DMBs; and W200bn was for the refinancing and
restructuring of SME/manufacturing sector existing loan portfolio, and where
necessary, to provide working capital.
The facility was at a concessionary interest rate of 1.0 per cent to the DMBs for
on-lending to their clients at a single-digit of 7.0 per cent. In the light of the
foregoing review of how central banks responded to the 2007-2009 financial
and economic crises, it is perhaps safe to draw the following conclusions:
The crises did not materially alter the traditional role(s) of central
banks particularly with regard to their stabilisation role;
• If anything it actually reinforced that role;
• The crises underscored the need for central banks not to be too
rigid with respect to pursuing the price stability objective when
economic slump occurs;
• Central banks should begin to pay greater attention to financial
stability since price stability and financial stability are not mutually
exclusive objectives;
• Central banks will need adequate direct powers as well as
increase their capacity to undertake macro-prudential analyses;
and
• Strengthening of governance structures, as more powers are given
to central banks.
In addition, in spite of the massive injection of liquidity during the crises, the
preponderance of evidence reveals the following downsides:
•

Credit extension has not resumed as expected;
Economic growth has remained sluggish;
How to roll-back some of the measures in the face of substantial
liquidity overhang;
However, there are some positives:
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Inflation has remained subdued in many countries;
Interest rates have remained low, and in some cases near zerobound;
Stability has somewhat been restored in the financial system; and
Macro-prudential environment has improved somewhat.
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IV.

Lessons of Experience and Options for Financing Government
Programmes In Nigeria
Central banks, particularly in developing countries intervened in the real
economy in order to enhance the transmission mechanism of monetary policy
actions and facilitated the development of the financial markets and created
easy access to credit for investment and production. This is predicated on the
existence of significant gaps between the demand for investment a nd the
availability of domestic resources. Indeed, the philosophy behind central
banks' interventions in the real economy is to indirectly influence cost of
production for firms and affect prices positively.
In the UK, the Bank of England has a unit that administers its small and medium
enterprises financing. In the United States, the Federal Reserve Bank identifies
and addresses a broad spectrum of challenges confronting low and
moderate income communities by developing their capacity through its
Community Affairs Department, which is responsible for supporting economic
growth at the lower end of the market. In Asia, central banks play vital
intermediation roles. For example, Bank Indonesia is involved in promoting
priority sector lending primarily in favour of MSMEs, micro-credit project for the
poor and self-help group linkage to banks.
The Philippines Central Bank, promotes appropriate financial market policies,
implements specialised microfinance schemes, capacity building and other
initiatives (rediscounting facility, Credit Bureau, rating agencies). The State
Bank of Pakistan 's Agricultural Credit and Microfinance Department is
responsible for meeting the credit needs of the agricultural sector, a major
foreign exchange earner. The Central Bank of Bangladesh is entrusted with
the responsibilities of formulating and implementing nationa l agricultural
credit policy. It maintains two Departments, namely: Agricultural Credit and
Financial Institutions Department and SME and Special Programmes
Department to perform these roles.
Similarly, in Africa, the Central Bank of Mauritius sponsors credit scheme for
sugarcane farmers who are the major foreign exchange earners in the
country; the Bank of Uganda manages various lines of development
programmes in the form of credit and term loans in collabouration with
accredited financial development institutions; the Central Bank of The
Gambia operates a microfinance supervisory department to take care of the
peculiarities of its rural credit market; the National Bank of Ethiopia undertakes
development finance activities by providing technical assistance and
investment in micro financing businesses; the Bank of Ghana has been
involved in rural credit support through its rural/community banking system;
the Bank of Sierra Leone's Development Finance Division supervises the rural
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banking and rural export credit guarantee scheme of the country; and the
Bank of Liberia actively participates in rural financing, manages a credit
guarantee scheme and performs other developmental functions.
Central Bank of Nigeria
The legal basis for the CBN intervention in certain sectors of the economy is
contained in Section 31 of the CBN Act, 2007 captioned "Developmental
Function". The section provides that the Bank, under its developmental
function, may subscribe to, hold and sell shares of any corporation or
company or debentures thereof set up with the approval of or under the
authority of the Federal Government for the purposes of promoting the
development of money and capital markets in Nigeria or of stimulating
financial or economic development.

The CBN intervention in financing government programmes in Nigerian has a
long history. The Bank has, since its early years, been actively involved in the
critical areas of the economy including Agricultural financing - the flagship
and most visible of CBN's involvement in financing government programmes;
establishment of Development Finance Institutions (DFls); development of
banking culture and networks; promotion of access to finance for small and
medium-scale enterprises; and entrepreneurship development.
Table 3 below provides a list of the various CBN interventions in the real
economy/government programmes in Nigeria.
n erventions In the Rea Economy
Tb13Llstf
ovarfous CBN It
a e

S/N
1
2
3

Intervention program

Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS)
Trust Fund Model (TFM)
Agricultural Credit Support Scheme (ACSS)

4

Entrepreneurship Development Centres (EDC)

5
6

Commercial Aoriculture Credit Scheme ICACSl
Nigeria Incentive-Based Risk Sharing System for
Agricultural Lending (NIRSAL)

7
8

SME Restructuring/Refinancing Fund (RRF)

9
10
11

Small and Medium Enterprise Credit Guarantee
Scheme ISMECGSl
Power and Airline Intervention Fund (PAIFl
Micro Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME)
Develooment Fund
Nigeria Electricity Market Stabilisation Facility
INEMSFl

Year
Established

1977/78
2001
2003
2008
2009
2010
2010
2010
2010
2014
2014
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Although, a comprehensive assessment of the impact of the various
interventions are yet to be undertaken, but judging the state of the Nigerian
economy today and the continued heavy reliance on oil, one can safely infer
that the achievement is only modest.
In this regard, therefore, a fundamental question arises, as to whether there is
still scope for continued intervention/financing of government programmes in
Nigeria by the CBN, particularly during economic downturn. While a direct
answer may not be readily given, one can make the following suggestions for
the future:
• The Bank should as a matter of priority undertake a comprehensive
evaluation of the various financing programmes with a view to
determining their effectiveness in delivering on the set target(s);
• Following from this evaluation exercise, the Bank should determine
whether it has reached the limit of its financing, as set out in Section 31
of the CBN Act 2007;
• A new framework for future intervention in the real economy or
financing government programmes should be established.
Such a framework should detail the modalities/conditions precedent for
intervention or financing, so that the Bank is not distracted from its traditional
stabilisation role. The framework should identify specific sectors with very high
potential of steering the economy in the desired direction and/or out of
recession; this will obviate the current ad-hoc interventions that depend on
the mood of the political authorities. The new framework should be backed
by law and made publicly available and easily accessible to ensure that the
Bank is held accountable;
Direct disbursement of funds to government should be avoided given our past
experience with the huge leakages associated with the finances of
government. Funds should be channelled through the financial system using
guarantees and on-lending rather direct credit, conditional on putting in
place a robust framework for monitoring to ensure that funds are not diverted
and/or that the funds get to the intended beneficiaries or sectors. Within the
confines of the enabling law, appropriate limits should be set for CBN
financing of government programmes to check the potential for abuse and
protect the credibility of the Bank.
Furthermore, future interventions in the real economy and/or financing of
government programmes should take into consideration the initial economic
conditions before the downturn such as liquidity condition; quantum of
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credit/rate of growth of credit; level of inflation; absorptive capacity of the
economy; rate of growth and level of unemployment; level of investment and
productivity in the economy; level of slack capacity in the economy;
state/health of the financial system: etc.
V.
Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, the following observations are necessary:

•

Experience has shown that there are no compelling reasons for the
CBN to abandon its traditional role of continuing to stabilise the
economy during economic downturn;

•

There is need for a comprehensive evaluation of its previous
interventions/financing of government programmes with a view to
refocusing such roles in future and avoid the current ad-hoc nature
associated with the subsisting interventions; and

•

Understanding of economic conditions precedent do matter for the
CBN financing of government programmes during economic
downturn to avoid any missteps capable of further exacerbating the
already adverse environment.
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